Why, despite well-established and well-publicized intergovernmental processes that date back to the early 1970s, have we been unable to put in place effective mechanisms to combat climate change? Why, despite the existence of extensive global human rights machinery, do we live in a world where mass kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder continue to blight the lives of so many? Why, despite a great deal of effort on the part of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non-state actors, have we been unable to make much of a difference to the lives of the ultra-poor and attenuate the very worst aspects of growing global inequalities? And so most fundamentally, why has the current international system and the outcomes that it has produced remained largely unaltered in the post-war period?
for its wooliness. 2 Yet, this scholarly undertaking should not only help us to understand better how to correct the mismatch between the demand for and supply of particular global governance mechanisms in the current order. It should also frame bigger questions that deal with where we have come from and where we are going;
and it should help prescribe course corrections and formulate strategies for a more stable and just world order. And intergovernmental organizations have been conceptualized as either limited and ineffectual or "sticky" and tenacious. 3 In large measure, this debate has been constrained because global governance has all-too-often been treated as virtually synonymous with the study of international organization 4 rather than with a wider constellation of actors, institutions, and mechanisms that together lend more order and predictability than expected to the world in which we live. The dominant focus of debate, in turn, has resulted in the application of existing methods in the study of international relations to global governance phenomena 5 
What Global Governance Is, and Is Not
All-too-often global governance is taken to be a synonym for international organization-the process by which states come together in cooperative arrangements when it is in their perceived self-interests to do so 6 The way that we have asked these questions suggest clearly a negative reply although nothing in this essay should suggest that any suggestion for "bringing the state back in," as a celebrated academic title put it. 8 States never left, except in a few imaginations, and will not depart any time soon.
Casting the analytical net widely has important ramifications for thinking about change and continuity in global governance, not only in terms of satisfying our intellectual curiosity but also and more importantly in prescribing what-and setting 6 out how-change could and should be pursued. Understanding change and continuity in such intergovernmental organizations as the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization is crucial.
However, in isolation it tells us little more than the particular evolutionary trajectory (or, in many instances, pathology) of an individual IGO and imbues us only with a limited capacity to reflect upon the general character of international organization as a process. Equally, thinking about possible IGO reforms is useful and even essential, but it does not tell us anything about the broader system of global governance. What we ought to be doing instead is focusing on instances of change and continuity in the general pattern of global governance in a way that is sensitive to discreet adjustments and moments of endurance among all of the actions and activities of the various actors, agents, and mechanisms involved in governing and organizing the world. We should also be looking at everyday adjustments and incremental changes that may in isolation appear to be little more than quotidian occurrences, but that may in combination be harbingers or amount to change that is significant or that impedes change.
While dealing with such a wide array of actors requires that we scrutinize the multiple ways of governing and how they interact and interrelate with one another, additional complexity occurs when we realize that global governance is manifest differently across time. The constellation of actors involved in governing the globe in the early decades of the twenty-first century, for instance, and the manner that they affect the shape of world order, are distinct from those that resulted in the postNapoleonic, inter-war, post-World War II, and other orders. Equally, we need to be sensitive to those fine-grained developments in the arrangements of these actors, but which may have been obscured by the broad passage of time.
Defined in this way global governance is not bound to, or even necessarily associated with, the post-Cold War moment, although that is when the term was coined and the moment with which it is most commonly associated. As we have argued elsewhere, too closely associating global governance with the easing of EastWest tensions beginning in the late 1980s robs it of both historical and futureorientated purchase. 9 E. H. Carr viewed history as an "unending dialogue between the past and the present"; 10 but the plea to learn lessons from a past that is older than merely the last quarter-century should resonate for more than historians. 11 It should also turn our attention to understanding the processes of change and continuity that together gave rise to the contemporary shape of global governance.
In contrast with the few who have emphasized the march of history, the ahistorical quality of too much social science and international relations is remarkable. 12 One reason may be the premium international relations scholarship places on parsimonious theories and simple causal explanations. History can appear to complicate this pursuit of parsimony and causality; but dealing with the messiness of history is preferable to achieving elegant theory at the expense of understanding.
Done well, history should make fundamentals clearer. In making this temporal stretch and thereby linking global governance to wide varieties of world order, we are able to make better sense of the purposeconsciously constructed or otherwise-of governance on a global scale rather than to 8 treat the constitutive elements in isolation from their context and consequence. We also should be able to stretch our geographical understanding of what is "global" about contemporary global governance if we can find ways of approaching it in prior historical moments that were not, unlike our own, bound together in overlapping and crosscutting networks, communications, and linkages across the planet.
One facet of work in the area that has robbed global governance of analytical purchase beyond the moment in which we live is to insist that "global" must also be "planetary." The tendency is to assume that because only in our era do we have institutions and technologies that touch every corner of the world, only now are we actually able to peer through the lenses of global governance. What is truly distinctive about the current global order is that it is the first defined by total human domination of the planet (that is, it is anthropogenic). 15 However, global governance was not absent in previous epochs. Prior formations of global governance merely produced world orders that physically encompassed less than the entire planet.
If the global in global governance does not necessarily mean planetary, what
then might be its analytical value? One of the utilities of global governance is that it infers the "big," the "macro," the "total." To break the linkage with the notion of having to be planetary in reach does not rob global governance of analytical traction if one considers that it remains concerned with humanity in totality but not necessarily the planet as a geographical unit. In that sense, whatever the reach of a particular order or empire, we are inevitably talking about human governance within it-albeit mindful that humanity does not exist in isolation or act apart from the physical world.
The resonance of such a world view, among states and non-states alike, holds additional lessons for students of global governance. A growing number of historians argue persuasively that the history of any epoch cannot be properly understood merely in terms of separate national or even regional narratives but necessarily must encompass a wider perspective and context even if the geographic coverage is less than planetary. 16 Elsewhere, we have argued that analyzing global governance from the earliest of human systems to the present day has a utility in helping us understand how and why we have ended up with today's world order. 17 This realization flows from the necessity of asking across time: "how is the world governed?" It is in seeking answers to this question that we could be positioned to understand how global governance has changed. We agree with Craig Murphy, who in looking our way, notes that, "no social scientist or historian is yet able to give a credible account of global governance over those many millennia." 18 It is, nonetheless, high time that we try.
Too few IR scholars have been interested in history before the twentieth century, and the vast majority in fact only at most the European era since Westphalia.
Yet it is precisely a dynamic interpretation of historical change that would lead to understanding the forces giving rise to particular patterns of governance (including Westphalia and before) that are historically unique and result from mutations in those forces over time. We do not advocate a crude Darwinism but rather an enhanced sensitivity to evolution that sees the progression of time as the foundry in which global governance (international relations and world order) is forged.
Our claim is not that states and the institutions that they have founded are marginal, or that they do not play an essential role in shaping world order as well as in creating and maintaining systems of global governance-as the European powers did after the Napoleonic wars, and the United States did after World War II. 19 Rather, as Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach suggest, a narrow focus on states fails, even more obviously now than in the past, to capture the multifaceted nature of contemporary world politics. In normative terms, in particular, too few analysts ask questions about alternative systems of governance-historically or contemporarilyand their role in shaping past and the present world orders. To quote Ferguson and Mansbach, "the frontiers of Westphalian states never demarcated political life as theorists imagined." 20 Nor, we might add, did they singularly determine the evolution of past, present, and future systems of global governance.
Comprehending Change and Continuity
If we can use global governance as a lens through which to view the various ways prior world orders were produced, we need not stop at the onset of industrialization, or the age of empire, or the Westphalian system. We need to delve into the earliest Our quest is more plausible now than earlier in at least three ways. 23 We should harvest the insights from these works but resist the temptation to stop there. We ought to risk grasping the nettle of global complexity more firmly, in particular to develop ways of framing the evolution of global governance over time and space. 
Conclusion
Global governance, if it makes sense at all, is not merely a descriptor for a post-Cold War pluralistic moment but rather a legitimate set of questions about how the world is governed and ordered at all levels and in every historical period. We have asked more questions in this essay than is customary, even for academics. We could apologize but will instead clarify and reiterate that our aim has not been to provide definitive answers. Global governance as an analytical endeavor is at too early a stage to accomplish such a feat. Rather, we are concerned at this juncture with developing the means to detect what drives change and what produces continuity-that is, what it is that we should be studying so that we are able to work out how it has evolved.
